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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1980 the mayor of Boston issued an executive order requiring that all 
construction projects funded in whole or in part by city funds should be 
performed by a work force consisting of at least half bona fide residents of 
Boston.* The Boston residency requirement order raises a number of 
interesting constitutional questions which have yet to be resolved.3 Apart 
from constitutional questions, however, it is important from a policy 
perspective because it represents a recent step in what has been substantial 
growth in the use of preferential treatment regulations by state and local 
govemments.4 In this paper we treat the question of whether residency 
‘We thank Anthony Rufolo, John Yinger, Edwin Mills, and an anonymous referee for 
helpful comments. 
*The requirement is described in some detail in White v. Mass. Council of Construction 
Employees, Inc., 103 SCt. 1042 (1983). The order covered not only city raised funds, but all 
funds which the city had the authority to administer. It forced private contractors who 
received city contracts to hire Boston residents for 50% of their work crews. 
3 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had found the executive order to violate the 
Commerce Clause (384 Mass. 446,425 N.E. 2d 346 (1981). The U.S. Supreme Court then held 
that the Boston executive order did not violate the Commerce Clause. The Court based its 
decision on the distinction between the state acting as a market participant and as a regulator. 
Where the line between participant and regulator ought to be drawn, and whether such a 
distinction is the relevant one, remain interesting legal issues. 
41n addition to Boston a number of other cities have residency requirements. See Hirsch and 
Rufolo [6] for econometric evidence that wages are significantly affected by residency require- 
ments, implying the requirements are, on average, binding. Moreover, this use is growing. 
Approximately 27 states also have statutes which require preferential treatment of in-state 
labor and materials in state-funded projects. 
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requirements of the Boston type can be supported on economic 
grounds-are they in the interest of the cities that impose them and are 
they economically efficient from a broader social perspective? 
In order to get at this question, we construct a number of models of a 
city in an urban area. We find, not surprisingly, that unless there is some 
other market imperfection, a residency requirement reduces overall eco- 
nomic efficiency. More surprisingly, however, we also find that we cannot 
rule out the possibility that individual jurisdictions may gain from such a 
policy. We also suggest that residency requirements can provide an effective 
way for cities to circumvent union seniority rules-with the possibility that 
both overall efficiency and city welfare are increased. 
In order to keep the analysis relatively simple, we do not explicitly 
consider long-term consequences of residency requirements. Rather, we 
look at the immediate impact on the welfare of city residents, taking as a 
meta-lemma that in suitably framed urban models when utility within a city 
goes up, the long run consequence (if the city is open) is that population 
will increase and land rents and housing prices within the city will increase. 
In evaluating the desirability of residency requirements by looking at the 
immediate impact, we implicitly assume that current residents of the city 
will be net winners in the long term to the extent that they are landlords as 
well as residents. The same result would be obtained were we to assume 
that the decision maker in our problem is a landlord. 
Since we focus our attention initially on whether a residency requirement 
is desirable from the perspective of a city that is considering its imposition, 
an explicit discussion of the global efficiency implications will be postponed 
to the end of the paper. In Section II we describe the basic model, one in 
which all resources are initially fully employed. Section III presents a 
version of the model in which some city residents are unemployed, and the 
residency requirement employs some of these people while displacing 
employment of suburban residents. Section IV of the model contains some 
extensions and suggests that the major economic motivation for residency 
requirements may lie in the manner in which they can be used to cir- 
cumvent union seniority rules, especially when senior union members are 
suburban residents. Section V contains an evaluation of the efficiency of 
residency requirements and Section VI some brief conclusions. 
II. A MODEL WITH FULL EMPLOYMENT 
We begin by analyzing the use of residency requirements by a city 
located within a metropolitan area which is sufficiently large so that in the 
long run the utility of residents within the city is fixed (for comparable 
individuals) and equal to the utility of others living in the metropolitan 
area. We also assume that there are two types of individuals, private sector 
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Notation in the Full-Employment Model 
wage rate of employees in the private sector 
wage rate of employees in the public sector 
number of employees in the private sector who reside in the 
city 
unit cost of capital 
cost of producing a unit of the public good 
level of the pure public good 
level of the private employees’ consumption of the private 
good 
number of employees in the public sector who reside in the 
city 
number of resident public employees in competitive 
equilibrium 
tax price of the public good faced by a private employee 
tax base of the city 
elasticity of public sector wages with respect to local 
resident public sector employment 
local tax rate 
employees residing in the city and in the suburbs and public sector 
employees in the city, all having identical utility functions but generally 
receiving different wages. The analysis is simplified by assuming that there 
is a unique pure public good that is financed by a proportional income tax.5 
Table 1 provides definitions of the notation we use in the analysis. 
In this first short-run full-employment model, we assume that all private 
employees in a city work in a purely competitive metropolitan labor market 
at wage rate wr. The city is small relative to the metropolitan area, so that 
the wage is tixed with respect to changes in the city’s policy variables. The 
number of private employees, Nr, is fixed in the short run, the period in 
which neither interjurisdictional migration of private employees nor the 
movement of private sector employees into public sector jobs is possible.‘j 
‘We deal with the case in which impure public goods are publicly provided later in this 
section. The income tax assumption allows us to avoid an in-depth evaluation of the effect of 
residency requirements on the housing market, which would complicate the analysis substan- 
tially without altering the nature of our results. 
60f course, short-run movements in utility will lead to longer run movements in population, 
both interjurisdictional and intersectoral; this will arbitrage the utility differences away. In the 
long run, and perhaps even in the short run, we expect job switches between the city public 
and private sectors. Entry into the public sector would obviously mute to some extent the gains 
to be obtained by using a city residency requirement. 
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Initially, the public sector is assumed to provide a pure public good 
produced in the city at unit cost c given by the cost function c(ws, s), 
where ws is the public employee wage and s is the exogenous cost of 
capital. The function c(a) is homogeneous of degree one and strictly 
concave in its arguments. The level of the public good, G, which is 
produced from capital and labor, but not land, is determined by majority 
rule voting in the city. 
Because a majority of residents in the city work in the private sector, the 
decisive voter is a private sector employee. 
Each private sector employee maximizes the utility function U(C,, G), 
where U( -) is a concave function and Cr is the level of consumption of a 
private consumption good. 
The focal point of our analysis is the local public labor market. In a 
competitive world with costless and unrestricted interjurisdictional migra- 
tion, the city would employ laborers from the city and from the remainder 
of the metropolitan area, i.e., suburbs, as well. All would be paid the 
identical wage (we have assumed no travel costs). The residency require- 
ment can then be viewed as an attempt to lower the tax price of the city’s 
public good by requiring suburban employees to reside in the city if they 
wish to work in the public sector. If the residency requirement is imposed 
initially in a competitive world, and suburban public employees can obtain 
the same level of utility by working elsewhere (they are not earning rents), 
then the local public wage must be raised to compensate them for the lost 
utility associated with city residence. The value of a residency requirement 
to the city can then be modeled by asking whether the increase in the public 
wage and tax base associated with an increase in resident public employ- 
ment makes the decisive city voter better or worse off.’ 
To pursue this approach, we assume that there is a perfectly elastic 
demand for public employees in the suburban public sector and that the 
city must pay all public sector workers identical wages. The relationship 
between the number of resident public employees and the public sector 
wage is given by a function ws = f(Ns), where f( .) = wP when Ns < Ns* 
(the competitive number of resident public employees)* and f’( -) > 0 for 
Ng 2 Ns*. Thus, in order to raise Ns above yp*, wg must be raised above 
wr. The following analysis deals only with thts case, the case in which the 
residency requirement is binding. 
‘We assume that all tax-base changes arise because of adjustments in the labor market. 
Were the housing market to adjust as well, residency requirements would lead to higher city 
rents, which is in the interests of owners, but not necessarily renters, of the housing stock. 
‘We assume that there exists a competitive equilibrium witbin the local public economy. The 
existence question has been raised by Stiglitz [ll], among others. A set of sufficient conditions 
for existence has been given in a somewhat more elaborate model by Courant and Rubinfeld 
[31. 
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From the perspective of the city, the residency requirement can be a 
potentially useful policy variable, since it can raise the public sector wage 
without changing the private wage. This is of value to public employees 
who would work in the city without the requirement. Whether it is of value 
to the decisive private employee, however, depends upon the effect of the 
residency requirement on the city’s tax base and on the cost of producing 
the public good. 
The analysis is simplified by examining the utility-maximizing behavior 
of the decisive voter. Note that with wr and the price of the private good 
fixed during the period of the analysis, the indirect utility function is simply 
V(P), where P is the tax price of the public good. 
The tax price P is given by 
where 
P = w&B, 
B = wpNp + wgNg. 
(1) 
(2) 
Because V'(P) < 0 for all P, it follows that maximization of U( .) subject 
to the voter’s budget constraint, the technology of public goods production, 
and ws = f( NJ is equivalent to the minimization of P. 
Thus we can evaluate the residency requirement from the perspective of 
the decisive voter simply by asking whether its imposition lowers the tax 
price she faces. (Recall that resident public employees are always made 
better off because their wages rise. Thus, if a residency requirement is 
desirable from the private perspective, it improves the welfare of all city 
residents.) To the extent that a residency requirement is effective, we expect 
that the level of public goods demanded would change, as would the factor 
proportions used in public production.’ 
To evaluate the conditions under which an increase in resident public 
employees will increase local private utility, we substitute (2) into (1) and 
totally differentiate. lo This yields the result that 
sgn[g]=sgn[te%-c(l+n) I> (3) 
‘Total public employment could either rise or fall. Total resident public employment must 
rise, or the constraint is nonbinding and has no effect. 
“Note that aw 8 /aNs is defined in such a manner that the number of public employees is 
sufficient to produce the level of public goods demanded. In other words, public production is 
efficient given factor prices, and G is chosen optimally by the decisive voter, given income 
and P. 
296 COURANT AND RUBINFELD 
where 
7 = the elasticity of public sector wages with respect to 
local resident public sector employment (l/n is the 
elasticity of resident public sector labor supply). 
The central results of the short-term full-employment model follow 
directly. 
RESULT 1. A necessary condition for a residency requirement to be 
desirable for the locality’s residents is given by 
where N, is the number of suburban residents who work in the local public 
sector and t is the local tax rate. 
Proof. This follows from (3), the fact that (from Shepard’s Lemma) 
c~c/&v, = (N, + N,)/G and the fact that t = cG/B.“~~’ 
COROLLARY 1. A residency requirement is like& to be adopted, other 
things equal, when the tax rate t is large. 
COROLLARY 2. A residency requirement is likely to be adopted, other 
things equal, when the wage elasticity, q, is small (i.e., the elasticity of labor 
supply is large). 
COROLLARY 3. A residency requirement is likely to be adopted, other 
things equal, when the ratio of total public employees to resident public 
employees is small. 
“The reason that the tax price can fall in spite of the fact that ws rises is due to the 
publicness of the public good. In the case analyzed here-that of a pure public good-utility 
is not concave with respect to total income in the community (see [ll]). Later in the paper we 
show how an impure public good leads to the condition analogous to (4) being more stringent; 
in the case of a purely private publicly provided good, the condition cannot hold. 
“The analysis in the text implicitly assumes that any increase in Ns occurs because 
suburban residents relocate in the city. If there is an initial population of public employees 
who work in the suburbs but live in the city, (2) becomes B = Wp N,, + Wg Ng + Wp N,, where 
N, is the number of out-commuting public employees. Carrying out the analysis in the text in 
this case, inequality (4) becomes (Ns + N,)/Ns < t(1 + l/n + N,/Nsp), where p is the 
elasticity of out-commuting public labor supply with respect to the public sector wage in the 
city. Plainly, p is negative, and thus the easier it is for out-commuting public employees to 
switch jobs (to the city’s public sector) the less likely is the augmented form of (4) to obtain. 
However, because of job-specific training and experience, seniority rules, and the like, we 
would not expect p to approach - cc, and, indeed, its absolute value could be quite small. To 
simplify the analysis, we explicitly assume that N, is zero (or that -p is small) for the 
remainder of this discussion. 
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Each of the corollaries makes intuitive sense. The larger the tax rate, the 
greater the gain (on the margin) to be achieved if the tax price of the public 
good can be lowered, since the tax rate provides a measure of the level of 
the public good consumed. A small wage elasticity (or a high labor supply 
elasticity) makes the policy more attractive because it assures that as the 
residency requirement becomes binding the public wage rate will not rise 
rapidly. In other words, the gains from a residency requirement occur 
because the increased number of public sector employees who take up 
residency in the city add to the tax base. Increases in the public sector wage 
rate, however, raise the tax price because they increase the marginal cost of 
producing the public good. 
Finally, the residency requirement is likely to be effective if there are 
initially relatively few suburbanites who commute to work in the city’s 
public sector. The greater the number of public employees who work in the 
city, the more that wage increases associated with a residency requirement 
will be captured in the city’s local income tax base. Were most city 
employees to be commuters, however, the high public sector wage would be 
paid primarily to those outside the city, and thus would not add to the tax 
base.13 
The statements in Result 1 and its corollaries illustrate that in the short 
run a local residency requirement can be desirable from the perspective of 
local residents.14 However, we see the converse statement of the corollaries 
as just as important. With competitive labor markets, there are reasonable 
conditions in which the short-run effect of a residency requirement will be 
to make residents of the city unambiguously worse off. In the longer run, in 
a more elaborate model, the city would then lose population and aggregate 
land values. 
Indeed, a guess at parameter values suggests that in general the current 
residents of a city will not be able to increase their tax base by imposing 
residency requirements. Even when (N, + NJ/N, is very low, say 1.1 (at 
1.0 the residency requirement is not binding), and t, the local income tax 
l3 Recall that we are dealing here with a small change in Ns. Were the residency requirement 
complete, i.e., all local public employees required to be residents, Corollary 3 would be 
irrelevant. 
14Recall that our analysis is marginal in the sense that we ask whether a requirement of 
residency for an additional suburban employee will raise city welfare. We could also consider 
the question of the “optimal” residency requirement using this model. Two types of more 
general results are possible: (1) there will exist an optimal partial residency requirement, given 
by setting (4) equal to 0; or (2) there will be a comer solution, arising because tax price falls 
monotonically as the residency requirement is applied to more public employees. In this case 
the city would hire public employees requiring residency, until it reached the constraint that 
the level of public employment demanded by the efficient operation of the public sector 
(Ns( ws( Ns))) was just equal to Ns with N, = 0. 
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rate, is very high, say 0.1, the policy makes sense only if 17 is less than 0.10, 
or the elasticity of supply of suburban public sector workers to city 
residency is greater than 10. If the ratio of public employment to resident 
public employment is 2.0 and t is 0.05, assumptions which are quite 
favorable for imposition of the requirement, then the critical value of TJ 
falls to l/39. Moreover, the argument in footnote 12 regarding out-com- 
muters makes the critical value of n even lower. We know of no evidence 
that bears directly on the actual value of 11, although we could imagine 
estimating 7) by looking at time-series data on responses to wage changes in 
the presence of residency requirements. 
In any event, the suggestive estimates of critical values of n given in the 
preceding paragraph depend on the unrealistic assumption that the govem- 
ment is producing a pure public good. If we assume instead that the public 
good is congestible, the public employee residency requirement becomes 
even less likely to be worth adopting. Suppose that the level of government 
services given to each citizen is given by g = G/Nb, where 0 < b < 1. In 
this case, the condition for the residency requirement to be adopted by 
private sector voters is 
Ng + N, 
Np 
+NbtqlfNWs9<tl+$. 
g P i i 
When ws = wp, (5) reduces to 
Inequality (6) cannot hold when b is unity (the government provides a 
private good) and if the public good is partially congested, the critical 
values of n calculated above are reduced by the factor 1 - b. Assume for 
example that b = 0.8, a result which is consistent with the empirical work 
of Borcherding and Deacon [l] and Gramlich and Rubinfeld [4]. If (N, + 
N,)/Ns = 1.1, and t = 0.1 as before, then the economic conditions support 
the introduction of a residency requirement only when the value of 17 is less 
than 0.02. Clearly, the more nearly private the local public good, the lower 
the benefit of attracting an additional employee to reside in the city, since 
the cost of providing that public good will rise substantially. The explana- 
tion of why cities put residency requirements into effect is likely, therefore, 
to involve issues that are not well captured in the full-employment competi- 
tive model. 
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III. A MODEL WITH UNEMPLOYMENT 
We have seen that in the full-employment model it appears likely that a 
residency requirement will be self-defeating from the point of view of city 
residents. One might argue, however, that when there is unemployment in 
the city there may be another source of potential local benefits associated 
with a residency requirement. If the residency requirement can be used to 
discourage suburban residents from working in the city (assuming there is a 
cost in terms of lost utility to moving), then unemployed workers in the city 
can be hired. This will obviously benefit the unemployed, but our concern 
lies with whether such a policy would also benefit the employed decisive 
voter. The model which follows suggests that gains can be made, but not in 
all cases. The benefit associated with increased tax base must be traded off 
against the cost of using employees who are less productive than their 
suburban counterparts.15 
We proceed by altering some of the assumptions made in Section III. We 
now assume that there are four types of laborers in the local 
economy-private employees who receive wage wr, productive resident 
public employees (denoted N,,) who receive wage wp = wr, productive 
nonresident public employees, who also receive wp = wr, and unproductive 
public employees (denoted i$ when employed) who are initially unem- 
ployed. If employed, unproductive public employees would have a marginal 
product of labor equal to awp = aw,, with 0 -C a < 1. We also assume that 
suburban public employees will resign rather than live in the city at 
wg = wp, i.e., n > 0. Over the relevant range, unemployed residents are 
supplied perfectly elastically to the local public sector at wg = wr,.16 This 
assumption assures that a residency requirement will lead to the displace- 
ment of suburban public employees by resident unemployed, unproductive 
workers, rather than to the relocation of productive suburban workers. 
The analysis of the possible adoption of a residency requirement pro- 
ceeds as in Section II. As in II, the tax price faced by the decisive voter is 
given by 
151n a competitive world, if the unemployed were not less productive they would not be 
unemployed in the first place. However, with a minimum wage law, some low-skill workers 
might be unemployed, while others of equal ability were working. With public sector unions, 
even this need not be so; we consider residency requirements as a possible tool for union 
busting in a later section. 
l6 We could make the parameter D decreasing function of the number of unemployed hired 
by the local public sector without aRcting our qualitative results. 
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B = wpNp + wgNgp = wpN, 
where N is total resident employment. 
The analysis differs from the previous case in that the marginal cost of 
producing an additional unit of the public good is now equal to c( ws*, s), 
where ws* is the “effective wage of an average public employee,” defined as 
wP 
*=w Ngp + Ng” + N, 
p Ngp + aNg, + N, I ’ 
(8) 
Given our revised labor market assumptions, it follows that as a resi- 
dency requirement is unposed, city public employees residing in the suburbs 
relocate their employment to the suburbs. The city responds by hiring 
previously unemployed unproductive workers. Once again, the decisive 
voter is better off if the tax price of the public good falls. The central result 
in this section is then: 
RESULT 2. A necessary condition for the residency requirement to be 
locally desirable in the model with unemployment is given by 
CG 
awp>wp- -. N 
Proof. The condition follows directly by substituting (8) into (7), differ- 
entiating with respect to NsU and evaluating the resulting expression at 
Ngu = 0. 
The necessary condition given in (9) states simply that the first unem- 
ployed worker should be hired, via the residency requirement, if the 
marginal product of the worker (aw,) is greater than the marginal cost of 
the hire (the foregone productivity of the suburban worker less the incre- 
ment that the newly hired work makes to the public fist). Clearly, such a 
condition may or may not hold, depending upon the parameters of the 
model. This is made clear in the corollaries that follow. 
COROLLARY 4. A residency requirement is desirable from the point of view 
of the city, other things equal, the smaller the gap between the productivity of 
employed and unemployed workers (i.e., the larger is a). 
COROLLARY 5. A residency requirement is desirable from the point of view 
of the city, other things equal, the larger is the individual tax share (cG/N). 
Once again the corollaries make intuitive sense. The imposition of a 
residency requirement in a world with unemployed, lower skilled workers 
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increases the tax base, but increases the marginal cost of producing a unit 
of the public good as well. Even if such a policy is effective it will be only 
effective up to the point at which the marginal cost and benefit of an 
additional city worker being hired are equated, as given by 
wpo - 4 Ngp + N, 1 CG Ngp + Ngu + N, = 7. (10) 
This condition is likely to hold as an interior solution as long as the 
marginal cost is increasing. 
Finally, it is important to recall that the residency policy is more likely to 
be effective in the model with unemployment than in the model with full 
employment. This can be seen by rewriting both conditions in a similar 
form and evaluating them at competitive equilibrium. 
[%y[i+] <I (4’) 
(1 - Lz) < t. (9’) 
If a is close to unity, as one might expect when NsU is near zero, (9’) will 
hold at very low tax rates. For sufficiently high values of 9, however, (4’) 
cannot hold even at high tax rates. It is interesting to note that a itself 
could be written as an elasticity, that of the effective wage with respect to 
NsU. Here, if the effective wage rose rapidly enough (i.e., if Q were far from 
unity), the choice between implementing the residency requirement by 
adding residents and paying higher wages or by hiring nonproductive 
current residents would depend (appropriately) on the relative magnitudes 
of the elasticities of effective resident labor supply. 
The result that the residency requirement is more likely to be adopted in 
the unemployment model also holds when the public good is congestible, 
although congestion makes the condition less likely to obtain than when the 
public good is pure. Following our earlier notation when the public good is 
congestible, the condition for a residency requirement to benefit private 
sector employees when there is unemployment is 
awp > wp + $(b - 1). (11) 
For b = 1 (the perfectly private case), the condition cannot hold. For 
values of b < 1, however, (11) can be rewritten as 
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For comparison, (6) can be rewritten as 
(6’) 
Again, (11’) can hold at high values of a, provided that b is low enough. 
Even at very low values of b, however, (6’) cannot hold at sufficiently high 
values of n. Furthermore, the possibility that (11’) may actually be con- 
sistent with real world parameter values, while remote, does not strain 
credulity. If unemployed workers are nearly as productive as employed ones 
(e.g., a = 0.95) and congestion is moderate (e.g., b = 0.5), then a residency 
requirement is locally desirable if t > 0.1, a condition that may obtain in 
precisely those high-tax large urban areas that tend to have residency 
requirements. Even here, however, the parameter values needed are some- 
what extreme, leading us to conclude that the motivation for residency 
requirements may he elsewhere. 
IV. EXTENSIONS AND SPECULATIONS 
I. Union Busting and Seniority Rules 
One possibility suggested by the discussion immediately preceding is that 
unemployed city residents are just as productive as suburban public em- 
ployees, but cannot be hired because of union seniority rules. In this case, 
as long as the public good has any publicness (b < 1) it will be in the 
interest of city residents to adopt the residency requirement if the outcome 
of such adoption is to cause the resignation of suburban workers and their 
replacement by unemployed urban residents (see (11) with a = 1). 
A variation on the above theme occurs when unions have been able to 
obtain wages such that ws > wr. l7 In this case, if a large number of union 
members are suburban residents, and if union seniority rules are such that 
new workers get paid less than old ones, the policy can reduce the cost of 
labor and increase the local tax base. In this case, the city as employer is 
able to weaken union power without acting directly to do so-it merely 
adds a new rule that has the effect of reducing wages. In a recent paper, 
Hirsch and Rufolo [6] present some empirical results that suggest that 
residency requirements lead to lower public sector wages than the absence 
of such requirements. One of Hirsch and Rufolo’s interpretations is that the 
resident civil servants have some loyalty to their city and would be 
embarrassed to strike against their own friends and neighbors. While there 
may be something to this, we find the explanation implicit in this discus- 
‘7Unions are not necessary for public wages to be higher than competitive levels. See Lewin 
and Katz [8] for details. 
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sion, and discussed by Hirsch and Rufolo as well, to be at least as plausible 
-in the presence of unemployment and the well-known tendency for 
higher income, established households to reside in the suburbs, the resi- 
dency requirement tends to cause the replacement of high-wage public 
employees with lower wage ones, thus reducing the average wage. One good 
market imperfection deserves another. 
Finally, there is the possibility that unemployed urban workers may be 
more productive than their suburban counterparts, given the demographic 
changes that have occurred in many cities and the consequent likelihood 
that many suburban public employees are of a different ethnic and cultural 
background from the populations that they serve, while their urban replace- 
ments are not. 
2. Voting on Local Public Referenda 
Local residency rules might also be viewed as an example of the political 
process working in the interests of a subgroup of the local population (the 
public sector), but not in the broader interest of all voters. Imagine a 
referendum process in which turnout is stochastic, so that prior to any 
referendum the probability that a millage for increased spending will pass is 
increasing in the proportion of resident public employees. Then a residency 
requirement can have a secondary effect on public spending, and perhaps 
public wage rates, beyond the effect described in the previous sections. By 
increasing the number of public employees who vote more often than do 
private employees, l8 the likelihood of greater (than optimal) local spending 
is increased. This argument is developed in a somewhat larger context in 
Mills [9], who discusses a number of cases in which public employees and 
public sector managers act together in opposition to private sector interests. 
In the long run, the possibility of such behavior is limited, but not 
eliminated, by private sector mobility.19 
3. The Possibility of Retaliation 
Assume for purposes of argument that a residency requirement is in the 
short-run interest of the city. Will the benefits be maintained over time as 
the suburban governments and their workers consider retaliatory moves? 
Consider the full-employment model first. Under our assumption of a 
perfectly elastic supply of suburban public sector labor, there will be no 
effect on the suburban tax base caused by the city’s residency requirement, 
since a new public employee will move into the suburb from another 
metropolitan area at the original wage. Clearly, in this case no retaliation is 
18See Rubinfeld [lo], and Gramlich and Rubinfeld [4] for empirical evidence supporting this 
view. 
“See Courant et al. (21. 
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necessary. In the more general case of a closed suburban labor market, the 
analysis is somewhat more complex. In this case, the residency requirement 
would raise the marginal cost of suburban public services (a higher wage 
would have to be offered to restrain workers from moving to the city), 
and would make suburban private sector residents worse off. Note, how- 
ever, that even in this case a policy of retaliation via a suburban residency 
requirement would only be effective to the extent that there are suburban 
public employees who reside in the city. 
The model with unemployment leads to similar results. Whether or not 
suburban residents are made worse off by the residency policy, there are no 
effective retaliatory moves. 
V. EFFICIENCY 
To this point, our analysis has been from the perspective of city residents. 
Here we briefly discuss the efficiency aspects of our models. 
1. The Full-Employment Model 
In the full-employment model of Section II, the city finds a residency 
requirement desirable only because the requirement may permit it to exploit 
a nonconvexity inherent in the nature of public goods. Put simply, the 
policy can be desirable only if the city is of suboptimal population in the 
sense that adding to population expands the budget set for city residents. 
Even if all jurisdictions are of suboptimal size, the efficiency gain in the city 
in question will engender efficiency losses everywhere else. Whether there is 
an overall efficiency gain or loss will depend on the circumstances in all 
jurisdictions. If all cities are of optimal size to begin with, the city in 
question will not want to adopt the policy. The one unambiguous case 
would be where the city adopting the policy is of suboptimal size, and all 
others are superoptimal. Unfortunately, the literature on optimal city size is 
too abstract to tell us when such circumstances might obtain2’ In any 
event, locally provided public goods tend to be sufficiently private in nature 
that the issue probably does not arise in an important way empirically-in 
the full-employment model the parameter values necessary for the policy to 
be desired appear to be very unlikely to obtain. 
2. The Unemployment Model 
As before, a nonconvexity is required in order for the policy to be locally 
desirable, and the presence of such a nonconvexity raises the same issues as 
in the full employment case. Moreover, as in the full-employment case, 
2o See Henderson [ 51. 
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there is a production inefficiency engendered by the fact that relative factor 
prices are distorted by the residency requirement (production of G will 
become too capital intensive). But there is also inefficiency associated with 
the fact that resources are unemployed to begin with, and this latter 
inefficiency is alleviated by the adoption of the residency requirement. 
3. The Union-Busting Model 
In the union seniority model there may be efficiency gains independent of 
the public nature of the public good. If wages in the public sector are above 
market levels, and can be reduced by imposition of the residency require- 
ment, our results suggest what appears to be a classic second best argument 
for imposing a constraint on the behavior of the labor market. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The question of whether and to what extent the federal government 
ought to be involved in monitoring the regulation of the state and local 
sector is becoming an important policy issue. If the state and local regu- 
lations are in the public interest, or if individual voters are mobile and have 
sufficient choice, then one might be hard-pressed to make a case for a 
federal role. However, if the regulations are not in the long-run interest of 
the public, and sufficient competition is not available, then a federal role 
becomes a serious option. 
This paper treats one particular state-local regulation-the local public 
residency requirement. We find that the set of conditions under which such 
regulations are likely to be in the general interest of residents of the cities 
that enact them is somewhat limited and that such regulations are less likely 
to be efficient when seen from a broader perspective. On the other hand, the 
regulations may be efficiency-enhancing, and the little empirical evidence 
that exists [6] is broadly consistent with this possibility, in that wages tend 
to be lower when there are residency requirements. In the absence of 
additional evidence then, we do not see a federal role regarding local public 
sector residency requirements. 
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